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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. M. WEBB, and 
SPENCER WEBB, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
MARGARET WEBB and 
MARGARET WEBB AS 
ADMINISTRATRIX OF 
THE ESTATE OF 
WILMER WEBB, Deceased. 
Defendants and Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF 
No. 7,208 
ON RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY 
Herein "A. br." refers to appellants' brief, and "R. br." 
refers to respondents' brief. 
Among other things, the court in settling the bill of ex-
ceptions herein made the following findings : 
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"4. That the issues herein were first joined on July 10, 
1947. 
"5·. That on July 14th, 1947, the clerk of this court 
received from counsel for the defendant a check for 
five dollars as a jury fee, and which letter contained the 
following request for a jury, to-wit: 
'We respectfully request you and the court to 
have the above case set on the jury calendar 
and that the setting be sometime after Septemb-
er 2nd, 1947.' " (R. 356). 
On July 15, 1947, in open court and in absence of counsel 
for the defendants, said request for a jury trial was denied. 
Prior to this time, both the court and counsel for the plain-
tiffs had been advised that we were unable to leave the trial of 
another case to try this case during June or July, 1946. 
Respondents concede in their brief that the issues ten-
dered by their complaint and joined thereon by the defend-
ants' answers, are legal issues. The -issues joind by plaintiffs' 
reply to the administratrix's second cause of action, are also 
legal issues. (R. 24, 28; A. br 8-9). Whether there was any 
contract between Wilmer Webb and his brothers for his 
support and maintenance, and whether there was any con-
sideration for such a claimed contract, may well be a legal 
issue for a jury, Thompson v. Brown Livestock Co., et al, 
74 U. 1 at p. 21-22; 276 P. 651. 
''In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal 
property, with or without damages, * *, an isstie of fact 
may be tried by a jury, unl;ess waived * * . '' 
U. C. A. '43, 104-23-5. 
'''We are of the opinion the instant case is an action at 
law. Almo~t without exception, the· rule is· that actions 
to try the title of real estate shall be tried to a jury."~ 
Norbach v. Board of Ed. of Ch. Exten., 84 U. 506 at 
p. 515; 37 P. (2d) 339. 
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Did defendants waive a jury trial? Did the demand for 
a jury trial come too late Y This court has held that where 
the demand for a jury trial was first made on the date the 
case was call'ed for trial, it came too Ia te, "there being no 
jury upon attendance," of the court, Emerson-Grantingham 
Implement Co. v. Giles et al, 59 U. 54; 202 P. 543. Similar is 
the case of Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. West, 
55 U. 357; 186 P. 114, where the request for a jury was made 
seven days before the date the case was called for trial and. 
more than two and one half-months after the case was set 
and awaiting trial. 
The rule of court in the Third District Court to carry out 
the statute of the reasonable time in which to "notice the 
motion" to have the case changed from a non-jury setting 
to a jury setting is "five days before the date of trial" as 
reported in Thompson v. Anderson, 107 U. 331 at p. 335; 
153 P. (2d) 665. 
Now, September 2, 1947, was the opening day of the 
fall term in the District Court of Millard County, Utah. In 
this district, terms have been set for the convenience of 
jurors, and the presumptions of difficulty in getting a jury 
at that time are not well taken. 
At the time of the setting of this case for trial, which 
was forty-eight days before the trial date, the court had be-
fore it our written request for a jury trial. All Section 104-
23-6 U. C. A. "43 provides is that the person desiring a jury 
trial "must demand it, either by written notice to the clerk 
prior to the time of setting such action for trial, or * * . '' 
The rule quoted by respondents is to the same effect. 
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Certain it is that this case was set for trial on the 15th 
day of July .. 1947, in our absence and for a non-jury trial. 
At that time, a written demand had been made for a jury 
trial, and the fee tendered. The court refused to permit the 
clerk to accept the fee, and immediately ordered it returned. 
An examination of the case of O,sage Oil & Refining Co 
v. McDowell et al, 220 P. 609 (Okl), does not disclose when, 
if at all, there was a demand for a jury trial. All that appear5 
in the report of the case is: "that the parties in open court 
waived a jury"; and that on account of illness of the 
judge, the trial was continued from December 9th· to Dec-
ember 15th, when it was tried. 
Likewise, the report of the case of Ezzell v. Endsley, 
169 P. (2d) 309 (Okl), does not disclose when, if at all, there 
was a demand for a jury trial. All the report of the case 
discloses is that the court "correctly held Ezzell to a previous 
stipulation to waive a jury." What the respondents quoted 
is the syllabus, and that states when the case "was called 
for trial" the parties waived a jury. 
From an examination of the report of the case of Nie· 
meier v. Rosenbaum, 63 P. (2d) 424 ('Wash)~ one cannot deter-
mine when the demand for a jury trial was made in relation 
to the trial date. From examination of the report, it may 
be that the demand was made on the date. of trial. 
The above three cases are much the same as our own 
case of Gibson v. McGurrin et al, 37 U. 158 at p. 167; 106 P. 
669, wherein it states: "In this case, there is nothing to in-
dicate that the respondent ever demanded a jury.'' 
It 1s agreed by ·both sides there were equitable issues 
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tendered by the affirmative defenses and counterclaims. 
These were properly triable to the court. 
We concede that the issues of whether the deed and bill 
of sale were in truth and in fact a mortagage, are equitable 
issues. We concede the issues are equitable as to whether 
the deed and bill of sale in qustion should be set aside as to 
Margaret Webb individually, and set aside as to the adminis-
tratrix of the estate of Wilmer Webb, deceased. On said 
issues, the jury would have been advisory to the court, Utah 
State Building and Loan Ass 'n. v. Perkins et al, 53 U. 474, 
173 P. 950. 
By what standard it can be determined which of these 
issues are major and which minor, does not appear from the 
cases. It does appear this court has held legal and equitable 
issues in the same case are to be separately tried. To support 
respondents' contention that the trial was proper in this 
case, they quote from Justice Wolfe's concurrip.g opinion in 
Petty v. Clark, 102 U. 186; 129 P. (2d) 568 at page 571. 
wherein is given the supporting citation of Park v. Wilkinson, 
21 U. 279; 60 P. 945. Upon examination of that case, we find 
the second syllabus of the case is weU supported by the 
decision. Said syllabus is : 
~'Actions to quiet title or to determine adverse claims 
under sec. 3511, R. S. 1898, may be of a legal or equitable 
character, depending upon the pleadings; but where 
there are both equitable issues and issues of fact in the 
case, the court should first determine the equitable is-
sue, and then submit the issues of fact to a jury upon 
proper instructions, and a failure so to do constitutes 
reversibl-e error.'' 
This decision has been followed in this jurisdiction: 
"This court has also held that when in a case both 
equitable and legal issues arise and it becomes necessary 
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to determine the equitable issues before proceeding to 
an adjustment of the legal rights of the parties, or some 
of them in such event the court must determine the 
equitable issues first. Park v. Wilkinson, 21 U. 285; 
60 P. 945, and cases there cited." 
Ketchum Coal Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Carbon County et al 
48 U. 342 at p. 353; 159 P. 737. 
This doctrine has not been repudiated or modified by our 
court. About this doctrine our court later said: 
"Further, it is a famil'iar rule that objections that a case 
is not of legal, but of equitable, cognizance must be timely 
interposed and at the threshold of the case. 3 C. ]. 756. 
The decisions of this jurisdiction are in harmony with 
that. Park v. Wilkinson 21 U. 279, * * . " 
Thompson et al v. Brown Livestock Co., et al, 74 U. 
1, at p. 22; 276 P. 651. 
At the outset of this case, we agreed there were equit-
able issues in this case which should be tried by the court, 
but on those, asked the jury to be advisory. Our position 
was, and is, there are substantial and material issues herein 
which should be submitted to a jury. We maintained our 
right to a jury trial and took our exception to proceeding 
without the jury. Upon this matter, we submit that appel-
lants did not mislead the court; but h the contrary, timely 
and properly demanded the trial by jury. The court refus(·'1 
to give appellants the right of such a trial. 
In view of the statements of counsel for the respondents 
that "appellants adopted a course of delays in pleading and 
further delays in getting the case to trial" and that "In fact, 
it would be tantamount to holding that litigants, by securing 
one or more delays or continuances after a case is once set 
trial, could secure a jury trial by artifice and indirection when 
such a right could not be otherwise secured,, it is only fair 
J 
' 
I 
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to state the facts which counsel for respondents knew about 
the extensions of time. 
Our client has had no business or property experience. 
She was a widow without a home, property or income. From 
the inception of this case, we negotiated for, and urged the 
plaintiffs for, a compromise which would at least l·eave the 
appellant herein a home in which to maintain herself and raise 
her children. Progress \vas made upon these negotiations, 
and it was not until the time of trial that they broke down. 
In addition, counsel for the appellants during the spring and 
summer of 1947, were involved in trying the case of Whitt-
aker v. Spencers et al, now No. 7181 before this court, in 
which eight attorneys were waiting upon the trial court. 
Until the court released us from that trial, we could not try 
this case. 
\Ve have examined all cases cited by the respondents. We 
find no case which holds that a demand for jury trial came 
too late which was made at the setting (or reset) at least 
forty-five days before the trial date. We find no case where 
a court upon substntial legal issues refused to grant a jury 
trial under similar factual situations. We submit on the 
legal issues herein that defendants were, and are entit-
led to a jury trial. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
This appeal is made on the basis that the evidence clearly 
preponderates against said findings. To limit the examination 
of the testimony to that of Mr. Crafts and Mrs. Webb, is an 
error into which respondents have fallen. To support such 
error,. they claim as evidence the incompetent, hearsay tes-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
timony of Mr. Crafts and the plaintiffs. In addition to appel-
lants' argument in her brief, we make the following reply 
thereon: 
Wilmer Webb's direction to the plaintiffs, by his letter 
of March 8, 1946, written for him by his niece, was to "go to 
the secretary or trunk and get the deed to the house and 
bring up so he can mortgage it to set some money for his 
hospital fee," (Ex. A. tr. 17). This is the representation which 
Jack Webb made to Margaret Webb on the night of March 
_9, 1946, when he presented said Exhibit "A' to her- that the 
instrument to be prepared was a mortgage. There is noth-
ing in all the writings of Wilmer Webb or the competent 
testimony of what Wilmer Webb said to change that auth-
ority and direction. Can the respondents claim that letter was 
authority for their taking and converting to themselves, each 
and all Wilmer's savings bonds, the title certificate to h1s 
car, and his water certificates? Can the transaction oi 
March 14 to 18, 1946, inclusive, be sufficient evidence to sup-
port said finding that said property became that of the 
plaintiffs? Plaintiffs fail to point out any evidence to support 
such findings. We find no such evidence in the record to 
support said claims. 
The respondents assert there is substantial evidence to 
support findings we attack. We call the court's attention to 
the status of the pleadings and evidence upon the question 
whether Margaret Webb intended to deed the home place 
-vvhen she signed the purported deed, and whether she knew 
it was not intended to be a mortgage, and that she was 
fully informed as to the nature df the instrument, (Finding 8). 
Paragraph III of the administratrix's counterclaim al-
leges:· 
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"That on and between the 21st day ofJuly, 1945, and the 
4th day of July, 1946, the decedent, Wilmer E. Webh, 
was the owner of and, together with the defendant here-
in as his wife, during said time was in possession of the 
following described property in Millard County, Utah 
to-wit: 
".-\11 of Lots Three ( 3) and Four ( 4), Block Seventeen 
( 17), Plat "A" Deseret Survey, being part of Section 
Five (5), Township Eighteen (18) South, Range Seven 
(7) \Vest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
"That thereon was and is situated the home of said 
Wilmer E. Webb and of Margaret Webb, his widow. That 
at all times herein mentioned since the commencement 
of the above entitled action, the defendant, Margaret 
Webb, has been and now is in possession of said property 
and claims the same as a widow's homestead under said 
Wilmer E. Webb, deceased, for herself and said three 
minor children." (R. 20-21; A. br. 5). 
The reply of the plaintiffs thereto is as follows: 
'"4. Admit the allegations of paragraph 3 of said coun-
terclaim, but deny that the said defendant is entitled to 
the possession of the property described in said para·· 
graph either as widow's homestead or otherwise." (R. 
27; A. br. 11). 
We have gone all through this case, and those pleadings 
have stood as they are - admitting that Wilmer Webb wa5 
the owner of said real property, which is the home place, up 
to and includilig the 4th day of July, 1946, which was the day 
of his death. Can that admission be ignored? We say not. 
It appears to us that said admission is strong evidence that 
the purported deed in question is but a mortgage. For the 
plaintiffs to have the purported deed from March 18, 1946, 
to July 4, 1946, and admit they were not the owner of the 
real estate herein described, but that the purported granter 
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therein is the owner thereof, seems to us in and of itself to 
require a finding that upon the home, said purported deed i<; 
a mortgage. 
About the manner in which the property would be held 
under the purported deed, Mrs. Webb testified Mr. Crafts 
said: 
~' * * He said that turning - if we would sign this 
property over to the brothers they would pay his hos-
pital bills, then if such time came that he was able to 
work again, all he would have to do would be to repay 
the money they had spent and his property would be re-
turned to him." (tr. 31, 66, 91). 
That is the way Margaret Webb understood and intend-
ed the instrument to be. 
The evidence shows she was inexperienced in business and 
did not know anything about descriptions; that she askrd 
her husband on March 18, 1946, whether he knew the home 
place was in that purported deed; and he advised her he 
didn't, but to not bother until he came home (tr. 39, 40, 
53, 66). 
Then, too, there was no change of possession of the 
property after the execution of the purported deea; every-
thing moved along just the same until after Wilmer's death. 
There was no care and attention given under the claimed 
agreement. 
Another error of the respondents is that they base their 
claim to a bona fide transaction with Mrs. Webb upon this 
position: "Mr. Crafts then went to see Margaret Webb on 
March 14th, at Deseret" (R. br. 24). That visit was on the 
. 15th of March, and not on March 14, 1946. That one day's 
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difference, with other evidence, takes from Mr. Craft's 
testimony in many respects its accuracy. 
Let it be observed that nowhere in the record is there 
any evidence that there existed between Wilmer Webb and 
Margaret Webb, husband and wife, any ground or cause for 
divorce; that Mr. \Vebb has consulted Mr. Crafts concerning 
his domestic difficulties; but that Mrs. Webb regarded 
them as trivial, and would not sign any papers toward get-
ting a divorce; that Mr. Crafts' announced views was these . 
domestic problems were trivial, and the differences could have 
been adjusted. Now, on the day before he went to see Mrs. 
Webb about the claimed reconciliation, what did he do? 
The hearsay, incompetent testimony, in part shows:-
that, ·on the day before Mr. Crafts first saw Margaret Webb, 
he called the plaintiffs to his office. Just after lunch on 
March 14, 1946, the plaintiffs came to his office (tr. 209). 
Mr. Crafts then told the plaintiffs the condition of Wilmet· 
was serious; that his spine had been disintegrating since h~ 
was taken ill; that two of the vertebra were seriously at-
fected and that the calcium was leaving the vertebra and 
going into circulation; that he might live a number of months 
or a number of years, but would be a helpless cripple the 
rest of his life; and that it was probably Wilmer's desire to 
transfer all of his property to them ( tr. 204, 209). 
There is no doubt but what the plaintiffs and Mr. Crafts 
then knew Wilmer's illness would be fatal. The ddendant 
pleaded in part: (from defendant, Margaret Webb's Answer 
and Counterclaim): 
"5. * * that about February 1946, the plaintiffs were 
informed and believed that the ailment of said Wilmer E. 
Webb would be fatal and that he would not recover 
from the same. That said fact and information was not 
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known to defendant until the middle of June, 1946 when 
the doctor for Wilmer E. Webb so advised defendant." 
(R. 15); tr. 180-3). . 
The repiy of the plaintiffs thereto pl<:aded: 
"5. Admit the allegations of paragraph 5 of the said 
counterclaim excepting that plaintiffs deny the defendant 
did not know the ailment of said Wilmer E. Webb would 
be fatal until the middle of June, 1946, but all'ege upon 
the contrary the defendant was aware of such fact as 
quickly ~s these plaintiffs." (R. 30; tr. 180-3) 
It was this afternoon of the 14th of March, 1946, as we 
have pointed out in our brief (p. 44-5), that the plaintiff's, 
with Mr. Crafts' cooperation, moved out to take over Wil-
mer's property. It was that afternoon when the partnership 
fund was withdrawn and the check of $500.00 drawn to pay 
Mrs. Webb (tr. SO; A. br. 44-5). It was in the conversations 
on the afternoon of March 14, 1946, in the presence of Mr. 
Crafts that the plaintiffs agreed between themslves they 
were to get all of Wilmer's property (tr. 244). 
On the next day, the 15th of March, 1946, when Mr. 
Crafts first saw Mrs. Webb, he did not acquaint her with 
the fatal nature of the iHness of her husband (tr. 31, 193-6). 
He did not acquaint her wit4 the events of the day before in 
which he participated; and he did not acquaint her with th~.: 
status of the proper-ty of Wilmer Webb; and erroneously 
advis~d her as to the urgent need of money._ Hm;</ever, it is 
clear frQm the record that Mr. Crafts, claimed agent of 
Wilmer Webb, and the plaintiffs, considered it imperative 
to obtain from Mrs. Webb on March 15, 1946, a purported 
divorce and property settlement before she could get in-
de.pendent advice. · Did she "accept" the $500.00? She d!d 
not; but submitted it to her husband for his determination. 
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His advice was to do nothing with it until he came home 
(tr. 39). 
\Vilmer Webb took Mrs. Webb and her three children 
into his home. He held them out to the world as his family. 
Can it be then that for an offer of a mess of pottage-a one 
thirty-fourth of the value of the estak ·- and without timely 
advice, by concealment and misstatements, the plan to take 
this property away from his widow and family, will be suc-
cessful f To the contrary, it is well said that the whole world 
owes a fiduciary duty to an inexperienced woman in regard 
to business affairs. It is difficult to imagine a clearer case 
of over-reaching, inadequate counseling, and active conceal-
ment of the husband's true condition and the status of his 
property, than in this case. Upon the clear, convincing, pre-
ponderance of evidence, the court should have found that 
the deed and bill of sale were what Wilmer Webb directed 
them to be, and what the purported deed was represented t1) 
be to Mrs. Webb - a mortgage to secure the money to pay 
his doctor and hospital bills. 
INCOMPETENT AND HEARSAY 
CONVERSATIONS 
Dudiey Crafts did not represent Margaret Webb, nor 
claim to. Neither did Wilmer Webb represent her. Mr. 
Crafts, a friend of Wilmer Webb and his attorney on domestic 
relations problems, called unexpectedly on Mrs. Webb to 
propose a divorce and property settlement. First, let us 
treat the question as to hearsay conversations against Mar-
garet Webb. 
Both of the conversations between Wilmer Webb and 
Dudley Crafts, lVIarch 10-13 and sometime after March 15, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
1946, at the Hospital in Salt Lake City, were outside of the 
presence of Mrs. Webb. The same is true of the two conver~ 
sations between the plaintiffs and Mr5. Crafts in his office in 
Delta on the 14th and 15th of March, 1946. With neither 
Mrs. Webb· or anyone to represent her in these conversations, 
they were heresay and inadmissible as to her, Corp. of Latter 
Day Saints v. Watson, 25 U. 45 at p. 50; 69 P. 531. The re-
spondents assert said conversations to be admissible because 
]\1argaret Webb testified to part of her conversation of 
March 18, 1946 with Wilmer Webb about the $500.00 check 
and the purported deed. Plaintiffs objected to said testimony 
of Margaret Webb on the ground that it was hearsay. We 
did not resist that object as to Margaret Webb as an individ-
ual, but as to the administratrix claimed it was admissable. 
~'he court admitted said conversation with the right of plain-
tiffs to move to strike. Plaintiffs did not move to strike. 
We. maintain ~ur objections of heresay, were well taken. (See 
our assignments Nos. 3, 3a, 3b, 3d, 4, 5, 6 and 7 - our brief 
pages 66·72.) 
On the grounds that said conservations were incompetent 
as to Margaret Webb, individually, the preceding paragraph 
is applicable. We submit the proposition to be sound, that 
tih1ess Mr. Crafts was proved to be the agent or attorney 
of Wilmer Webb to make the claimed agreement, purported 
deed, and bill of sale, the conversations outside of the pres-
en~e of Margaret Webb are also incompetent to her as 
administrat,rix. 
We timely made the objection that the plaintiffs could 
not establish said agency by the declarations of the agent, 
himself ( tr. 189). Our objection was denied and overrulled. 
In. addition, Mr. Crafts testified concerning his agency and 
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{;mployment by Wilmer \Vebb: '' * * I woutdn 't hardly say 
it was employment, I had been previously employed by him. 
I was requested, as a friend of his by him, to do certain 
things.'.' (Tr. 189). 
"Doubtless, it is essential to the admission of the declar-
ations of agent as part of the res gestae that the fact 
of agency or authority be first proved. This fact can-
not be proved by the declarations themselves, no matter 
how publicly made, nor by declarations accompanied by 
acts purporting to be performed in behalf of the prin-
cipal, unless they are brought to the latter's knowledge." 
Jones on Ev. Civil Cases, 4th ed. sec. 356, p. 659. 
"In our opinion, it would be a dangerous precedent to 
hold that the relationship of attorney and client in a 
particular case can be established by the fact that such 
relationship exists in some other case, even though the 
subject matter of the two cases may bear some apparent 
relation to each other, * *" 
Sandall v. Sandall, 57 U. 150 at 161; 193 P. 1093. 
5 Am. J ur. sec. 29 p. 279 
Defendants objected to the admissibility of said conver-
sations under our statute U. C. A. '43 104-49-2,.. on the 
ground said conversations were incompetent, and also that 
the witness was incompetent to give over the objection of 
the administratrix of Wilmer Webb's estate. The article of 
Justice Wolfe in the Utah Bar Bulletin of July-August, 1941 
points out: . 
"Although the question has apparently not been decided 
in Utah, there seems to be nothing in the statute which 
prevents the agent of a surviving party from testifying 
to the transaction with the deceased". 
The citation of 21 A. L. R. 928 (1922) sustains this view. 
In this case, however, the plaintiffs and Mr. Crafts ex-
pressly testified Mr. Crafts was not the agent of the surviv-
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ing parties plaintiff, but claimed to be a friend of the deced-
ent. Accordingly said rule is not applicable. We found no 
case sustaining the view that the "claimed agent" of a de-
ceased party can testify adversely to his estate. We sub-
mit the rule of incompetency under dead man statue, and on 
other grounds heretofore argued should prevail ; particularly 
in veiw of the situation that we have no way of checking 
the accuracy of the claimed agent when alone with the 
deceased. 70 C. J. page 348 N. 23, Whitaker v. Groover, Stubbs 
& Company 54 Ga. 174. 
The cases and argument of respondents about declara-
tions against interest of a grantor, do not fit 'the evidence 
in the case. 
We submit the objections to the incompetency and here-
say conservations were well taken, and should have been 
sustained. 
REPLY TO "MISCELLANEOUS" ARGUMENT 
The respondents say this is not a case "involving the 
right of a husband and wife, as between themselves, or one 
where a husband has made a property settlement with the 
wife or secured some most marfl agreement or make a set-
tl-ement with the wife in anticipation of a divorce" (R. br. 
37), We do not agree. 
The testimony ·of Mr. Crafts regarding that contention 
is in part : ''I asked her if she was willing to make a property 
settlement and then go ahead and file suit for divorce, so 
that he (Wilmer) would definitely know how much he had 
_to pay her, how much property he had left. * * " ( tr. 194). 
''She- said to me that the property settlement could be ar-
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ranged without any difficulty * * " True, she was willing, 
if necessary, that aH of their property go to care for Wilmer, 
even to the extent that she move out of the home so he 
could get the income therefrom; but Wil'mer requested that 
she remain therein. 
Mrs. Webb, in part, testified of Mr. Crafts' conversation 
with her on March 15, 1946: "They wanted me to get a 
divorce, and wanted to know what I would take as settle-
ment". (tr. 31). "He finally asked me how $500 would be as 
a settlement." She didn't know what the $500 was to· be 
for as she had refused to get a divorce ( tr. 32-3). 
We submit the great preponderance of the evidence is 
against the contention of the respondents that Mrs. Webb 
refused to stay with her husband and take care of him. When 
the question of care and maintenance of Wilmer W ~b~ aros~, 
he was then in the hospital on his death bed; five doctors 
were waiting upon him; he was needing blood transfusions; 
and the plaintiffs and Mr. Crafts then knew the disease would 
be fatal. It was but a play of words to talk of anything else 
but keeping him in the hospital where he could be cared for, 
until he could come home. A reference to:- letters of the 
parties between themselvses, Exhibits "5 ", "Y", "3 1 ', 
"A", "E", "R"; the events of l\1arch 14,1946 in the office 
of Mr. Crafts; to the manner of taking his bonds, water stock, 
car certificate, and cash; the pittance of $53.14 which Mrs. 
Webb received during January to July, 1946, inclusive out 
of the estate and property; the "fencing off" of Mrs. Webb 
·from March 8, 1946 on; and the fact of Mr. Crafts' speed and 
urgency in getting Mrs. Webb's signature before she had 
time to get independent advice:- will all compel the view that 
the great preponderance of the evidence is against the find·· 
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ings appealed from and against the argument of respondents 
on said issues. 
We disagree with the respondents upon the question of 
the burden of proof of fair dealing in this case also: 
''Where an old lady conveyed all her estate of $40,000 
or more to her best friend, in considration of the latter's 
agreement to support her during life, in the grantor's 
suit as an incompetent to set aside the conveyance, the 
burden of proof was on the grap.tee to show the absolute 
good faith and unquestioned fairness of the transaction." 
Rogers v Scott et al, 151 P. 379, syl. 1 
To the same effect is the following: 
"Deatings by a spiritual adviser with one who is with-
out indebendent advice, and is about to die, and whose 
mind is imvaired by a physical weakness, by which the 
adviser receives any advantage in the transaction between 
them, will be set aside as being -contrary to the principles 
of equity, whether the benefit accrues to the spiritual 
advisers or to some other person who may have become 
the beneficiary through such influence. 
Corp. of Latter Day Saints v. Watson, 25 U. 45 
syl. 3; 69 P. 531. 
California cases which reSpondents quote upon the suf· 
ficiency of the consideration, refer to an earlier California 
case of Parsons v. Cashman et al, 137 P. 1109 which is en· 
lightening: 
_ ''The sufficiency of a purported or claimed consideration 
for a contract of the character. under discussion must be 
determined from the facts of the transaction as they ex-
isted when the contract was made, rather than by sub-
sequent developments. Such consideration, before it may 
be declared sufficient, must disclose not only a benefit 
• conferred or agreed to be conferred upon the promisor, 
but must reveal as well some prejudice, detriment, or 
disadvantage suffered or agreed to be suffered by the 
promisee as an inducement for the promises which form 
the basis of the contract. Civ. Code, sec. 1605." 
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The court then discusses the evidence, and points out 
that neither the contract nor the circumstances, expressly or 
impliedly, shmvs the promise of the diseased operated as an 
inducement to the plaintiff to relinquish, wholly or partly, 
anything of present or prospective value or advantage; and 
that in making the contract, nothing of value was abandon-
ed, and that the obligation assumed by the plaintiff did not 
require him to abandon any particular position of present 
or prospective profit. Here was something to gain insteail 
of something to lose. 
The same is true of the facts in the case at bar. The 
plaintiffs did not change their position in any way; the_y 
rendered no care or attention after the purported contract 
which they had not rendered before ; and they did not sign 
any writing or obligation by which any person could hold 
them to pay any obligations. The evidence shows they paid 
nothing. 
After searching the authorities, no case has been found 
which upheld such a purported consideration. 
In the cases cited by the respondents, there were writ-
ings marking the obligations of the persons receiving the 
property, made after careful and full advice when the owner 
of the property was well; and many independent witnesses 
appared and substantiated the fairness and independent ad-
vice of the persons parting with the property. In the Johnson 
v. Studley case, 252 P. 638, Studley gave up the gainful oc-
cupation of a carpenter; and he and his wife took Bentson 
into their home and properly and carefully cared for him un-
til he died. Such is shown by the many cases cited and ref·· 
erred to in 101 A. L. R. 1097-1106; and in each and aH of them 
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such elements are present which are not here present. The 
case of Long Beach Drug Co. v. United Drug Co., 88 P. -(2d) 
698, deals with the enforcement of a business sales contract, 
and does not approach the personal relations contract or 
case as does this cause. 
We call the court's attention to the failure of the respon-
dents to meet the argument that a widow and minor children 
of a decedent are his creditors under the law; that the trans-
fers claimed to be valid by the respondents, in such event, -left 
Wilmer Webb insolvent and unable to care for or maintain his 
family; and that the reasonable value of that support and 
maintenance would, up to date of this appeal, be more than 
$1500.00. Finding "4", to which no exception was taken, is 
that Wilmer took the three minor children into his home, 
and they were supported by him and Mrs. Webb jointly. 
''Where on stands in loco parentis to another, the 
rights and liabilities arising out of that relation are, as 
the words imply, exactly the same as between parent and 
child. 1 ' 
Sparks v. Hinckley, 78 U. 502 at p. 506; 5. P (2d) 570. 
ADMINSTRATRIX'S RIGHT TO AN ACCOUNTING 
Plaintiffs fail to point out or refe,.. to any evidence under 
which they claim "all Wilmer's property". They fail to 
poin_t out or refer to any evidence to support such a claim. 
They fail to point out or refer to any purported settlement 
or accounting at the dissolution of the partnership, or at any 
time, or at all. There is no substantial evidence in the record 
to sustain such claims, or any of them. Wilmer Webb had 
a right to an accounting on or within a reasonable time after 
the 18tp day of March, 1946. No accounting was made to 
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him, or claimed to have been made to him. No accounting 
has been made to his administratrix. 
\Ve deny that the record shows: ''that Wilmer, with 
Margaret 1S full knowledge and consent, was turning all of 
his property to the plaintiffs in consideration of maintenance 
and support of Wilmer and the payment of his outstanding 
hospital, doctor and other indebtedness.'' we deny the record 
shows a purported transfer to the plaintiffs of title to Wil-
mer's car, his bonds, his water certificates, his hand tools, 
his personal belongings, and partnership animals, or any of 
them. We deny the record shows the consent of Margaret 
Webb to the transfer to the plaintiffs of any personal prop-
erty of Wilmer Webb, or even any knowledge thereof, until 
after his death. We deny it shows o consent of Margaret 
Webb to the transfer of Wilber Webb's real estate on the 
basis claimed by the plaintiffs. 
The bill of sale purports to transfer ''all other livestock 
owned by me or in which I have an interest," whatever said 
disjunctive clauses mean. No reference is. therein made to 
partnership animals. We maintain as heretofore argued,· that 
the great prepondernce of evidence shows no such agree-
ment, no consideration for such claimed agreement,- and no 
evidence of the transfer of "all the property" of Wilmer, and 
no transfer of his rights to such property. 
Respondents are mistaken that the record is silent as to 
how the stipulation to which they refer was reached. The 
record on that is as follows: 
''Udell R. Jensen, Attorney for defendant herein came 
before the court and objected to certain recitals in pro-
posed findings submitted by pJ,aintiffs herein. Therupon 
a stipulation was agreed to and between counsel for 
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plaintiff and defendant, making certain changes in said 
proposed findings and decree." (R. 360-361). 
The announced decision of the court and the proposed 
findings of the cour-t compl·etely omitted four items on which 
no dispute existed. Counsel for the plaintiffs admitted several 
items were established in favor of de~dants, and stipulated 
as to them, but no others. Said items were: 
FIRST: Paragraphs 11 and 13 of their reply admit that 
Wilmer Webb was the owner of the guns and a pair of field 
glasses (R. 28). 
SECOND: That on or about June 1, 1946, Spencer Webb 
received from the Oasis Seed Plant, Farmers' Cooperative 
$422.91 belonging to the partnership of Webb Bros., consist-
ing of Wilmer Webb and the plaintiffs, which the plaintiffs 
appropriated to themselves (Ex. BB and tr. 235-6). It was 
this item on which the parties stipulated the administratrix 
was entitled to $141.00, approximately one-third thereof. 
THIRD: That the plaintiff, J. M. Webb, on cross-
examination testified. 
'' Q. You think there IS owing some money, owing tu 
to the administratrix from the partnership of Webb 
Brothers ? '' 
"A. Yes." 
''Q. How much?'' 
"A. About $90." 
(tr. 157) 
This was for the pellets and is the $90 covered in the stip-
ulation- ( tr. 157). 
FOURTH: The record shows the plaintiffs put a padlock 
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on the barn ( tr. 50). And off the record, it was conceded 
they took the grain which was Wilmer Webbs, as far as we 
can determine. The $90 is for the value of his grain. 
Vvre deny that the stipulation was intended to cover 
"whatever assets might be due the administratrix of Wilmer 
Webb's estate". There is nothing in the stipulation to so 
shmv. The record establishes defendants were entitled to 
judgment for other items which were not conceded by the 
plaintiffs, not covered by the stiuplation, and on which no 
accounting was made. 
Independent of the accounting which is due under the 
mortgage, and situation when the deed and bill of sale art! 
set aside, the record shows an accounting is due from the 
partnership to the administratrix on the following: 
(1) The status of the moneys received and expended 
by J. M. Webb and Spencer Webb for the partnership over 
three years prior to, and at the time of, dissolution of thl' 
partnership; and the accounts kept by them 
(2) The $445.57 which the plaintiffs took for themselves 
from the partnership funds on March 14, 1946 (last check 
Ex. "U"; tr. 227, 249-50). 
(3) The shortages of $1923.72 from moneys of the part-
nership received by the plaintiffs from sale of seed between 
April 13, 1944, and February 7, 1946. (Ex. "DD", ''H", and 
"I"; A. br. p. 62-3). 
( 4) The disposition and ownership of the 120 head 9£ 
catde assessed to "Webb Bros." by the County Assessor ou 
January 1, 1946, and of which the explanation by the plaintiffs 
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was completely a "hedge" and unsatisfactory ( tr. 115-18. 
157-67). 
( 5) All of the hay and feed the partnership raised during 
the cropping season of 1945 which plaintiffs admitted to he 
partnership feed, but claim was fed to their cattle ( tr.l57-67). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Accordingly. we submit the views set out in our brief 
on appeal should be adopted. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of February, A. D. 
1949. 
JENSEN & JENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants 
Reveiced copy this 
1949. 
day of February, A .D. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents 
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